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  1I. INTRODUCTION 
Anecdotal accounts suggest that hyperinflations leave a long-lasting mark in people’s 
memories of the hardships introduced by run-away inflation. These memories, the story goes, 
lead central banks to adopt subsequent long-term monetary policies that are more conservative 
than the long-term monetary policy observed in the average country lacking a past of 
hyperinflation.  
Most, but not all, of the anecdotal accounts refer to the German experience of the early 
1920s and the subsequent long-term conservative stance of monetary policy followed by the 
Bundesbank, commonly attributed to the trauma caused by the 1923 hyperinflation (see some 
quotations in section two below). The importance of the episode is out of question, but even if 
one takes the story at face value, the doubt remains on how general the German results are. 
Concretely, has the German experience been repeated in other countries? Furthermore, and to the 
extent that some other countries have indeed repeated the German pattern, how general is the 
result? Does it survive in a wide cross-section of countries? These are the questions examined in 
the second section of this paper. The findings are both statistically and economically significant.        
  Why does hyperinflation lead to lower subsequent long-term rates of inflation? 
Moreover, what are the mechanisms at play? The third section of this paper proposes a model that 
suggests a rationale for the outcome: hyperinflations act by reducing the costs of collecting 
conventional taxes vis-à-vis the costs associated with the collection of the inflation tax. This is the 
main lesson that societies that lived through hyperinflation seemed to have learned and 
internalized: no matter how highly distorsionary conventional taxes may be, they are always 
preferable to the social costs imposed by the massive use of the inflation tax to finance the 
budget. Section four of this paper discusses the main rationale advanced by the model against 
available evidence from country case studies, in particular in regards to the key role that 
conventional taxation played in terminating hyperinflations, and it also discusses the role played 
by some critical assumptions of the model. Section five briefly concludes the paper.      
  2II. WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS 
 
This section reviews the evidence concerning the effect of past hyperinflationary experience on 
subsequent, long-term inflation outcomes. First, some anecdotal evidence on the German and 
Argentine experiences is reviewed. Next, the cross-country data after WWII are examined and 
discussed. 
 
II.A. Scattered pieces of evidence from the cases of Germany and Argentina 
 
When the issue of the legacy of hyperinflation in Germany is discussed, even the non-
technical literature produces statements along the following lines: 
“It (the collapse of the German currency) left a permanent mark on the psyche of the nation, with 
far reaching effects that the passing of time has not been able to eradicate completely. Thus, on 
various subsequent occasions, the mere fear of inflation which the trauma of the 1920s had 
implanted in the minds of the German people was responsible for policies and attitudes, 
sometimes for better, sometimes for worse. In 1924, for instance, it helped to create the spirit of 
restraint and self-denial needed to maintain the stability recently brought to the currency. 
Conversely, during the world economic crisis of the 1930s, it prevented the German authorities 
from applying even mildly inflationary policies, which might have made the recession less 
disastrous.” Guttmann and Meehan [1976, p. xi]  
 
  The issue is taught to undergraduate students taking the Money and Banking course in a 
similar way:  
  “The ghost of the inflation after World War I still frightens many Germans today” Meyer 
[1986, p. 41] 
 
  “Not surprisingly, given Germany’s experience with hyperinflation in the 1920s, 
Germans have had the strongest commitment to price stability as the primary goal for monetary 
policy”. Mishkin [2000, p. 457].     
 
 
And a similar view is held in policy circles, as well: 
 
“…the inflation of 1923 left a terrible legacy for the future fate of our country… The 
objective of stable money was and is deeply rooted in our society. It is based on a wide consensus 
in broad sections of our population. It is based on a culture of stability. That is why German 
public opinion --particularly in critical periods-- again and again proved a loyal ally of a stability-
oriented monetary policy”. Tietmeyer [2001, pp. 7-12]. 
 
Sometimes, even quantitative comparisons are advanced: 
 
“Germany has achieved a high degree of price stability.  In that respect, the last 50 years have 
been in distinct contrast to the monetary upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century with 
  3their calamitous political and social consequences. A comparison with inflationary developments 
in other countries during the past fifty years also testifies to how deeply stability awareness is 
anchored in Germany --something which is undoubtedly due to its specific past experience. The 
average annual rate of inflation in the UK over the past five decades –based on a broad index of 
consumer prices- has been 6.4%, for example. By contrast, the corresponding German rate has 
been 2.8%. Even countries with a traditionally stronger anti-inflationary orientation, such as 
Switzerland and the United States, have recorded higher rates of monetary erosion than Germany 
–at 3% and 4.1% respectively”. Konig [2001, p. 56]. (Italics added). 
 
For clear and well-justified reasons, the Argentine hyperinflation of 1989-91 has not 
attracted as much attention. Nonetheless, there has been no lack of speculation on the legacy of 
hyperinflation. Reflections have gone along similar lines.  
“The loyalty of Argentineans since 1991 to the Convertibility Plan…has been similar to the 
persistent loyalty of Germans to their anti-inflation commitment. Both are rooted in their 
countries’ bad histories of inflation. Many would argue that low inflation in Germany since 1950 
and in Argentina since 1991 are owed to institutional commitments –the independence and 
legislated commitments of their central banks. But I suspect that such independence and 
commitments have survived only because of the support of public opinion that has its roots in 
historical memory”. Corden [2002, p. 181]. 
 
  Even after the traumatic collapse of the Currency Board arrangements in January 2002 --
involving an unprecedented institutional crisis that witnessed the resignation of two different 
presidents in a period of a month--, not all professional economists agreed with the conventional 
wisdom of the times concerning the inevitability of a new hyperinflation: 
 
“Many people think that we are headed toward hyperinflation. That can indeed happen, but it is 
not something inevitable. The inherited economic mess and the colossal policy mistakes of the 
Duhalde administration are not themselves sufficient to generate a new hyperinflation. 
Hyperinflation is a monetary phenomenon that depends on both the demand for and the supply of 
money. Up until this point (July of 2002) the demand for money has shown a striking resiliency. 
The stability of the demand for money is all the more surprising if we recall that the Peso has 
devalued by more than 70% (since January 2002)…Regarding the supply of money…the federal 
treasury has received only small transfers from the central bank. Memories of the 1989-91 
hyperinflation have had a very positive influence via a huge ‘fear effect’.” Espert [2002, pp. 2-3]  
   
 
II.B. Cross-country evidence on hyperinflation and subsequent long-term inflation 
 
This subsection is devoted to analyzing the cross-country evidence on the effects of 
hyperinflation on subsequent inflation outcomes for the period 1949-2002.  
II.B.1. Description of the data 
  4The data are from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
(IMF-IFS) database, and consist of averages through time for each country for the period 1949-
2002. The main advantage of using averages over a long period of time is that the chance of 
capturing short-run dynamics (rather than the long-run behavior of inflation) is substantially 
diminished, if not completely eliminated.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the inflation data. From the information 
reported in Table 1, it is noteworthy that roughly 25% of the observations associated with 
countries that have not undergone hyperinflation correspond to average inflation rates above 
12%, the maximum average inflation rate observed in the aftermath of hyperinflation. Indeed, for 
countries that have had hyperinflation, annual inflation rates range from roughly 2.5% in the 
cases of Macedonia and Germany, to 11.9 % in the case of Nicaragua. On the other hand, the 
maximum rate of inflation for countries that have not experienced hyperinflation is 82.79%, 
corresponding to the case of Zambia (a clear outlier; more on this topic below). Remarkably, even 
if we concentrate our attention on OECD countries that have not experienced hyperinflation (that 
is, Germany and Austria are excluded from the OECD group), the average rate of inflation for 
this group is 8.19%, higher than the 7.07% mark characterizing the average inflation record in the 
post-hyperinflation period for the countries in the sample.       
II.B.2. Methodological Issues 
Table 2 lists the twenty one countries classified as having a hyperinflation and reports 
their subsequent average inflation outcome. Cagan’s conventional threshold of a rate of inflation 
of at least 50% per month was used to classify the hyperinflation experiences.
1 Two questions 
arise at this point. First, what were the criteria that led to the inclusion of the twenty countries 
listed in Table 2?  Second, how does the list compare to other relevant studies on hyperinflations? 
First, Serbia (Former Yugoslavia) was excluded from the sample for lack of data in the IMF-IFS 
database. The same is true of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. These three countries were included 
by Fischer et al. [2002] in their study of hyper and high inflations. Second, Belarus was excluded 
  5from the sample both because it is (still) living a situation --prevalent for the whole 1990s--, 
reminiscent of high, chronic inflation, not of a hyperinflation and because its "market socialism", 
coupled with authoritarian rule and inefficient state enterprises operating under soft budgets --
financed through the printing of money-- all within Soviet style planning arrangements, has 
artificially delayed reform, preventing stabilization from taking place. Third, Congo (CDR) and 
Angola, countries that experienced hyperinflation and for which data are available in the IMF-IFS 
database were excluded because until very recently (up to the present day in the case of the CDR, 
and until 2002 in the case of Angola) they continued to experience civil wars that prevented the 
stabilization of inflation from taking place. 
A second important methodological question is how to deal with countries that 
experience hyperinflation more than once. When a country experienced hyperinflation at two 
different points in time, the following criteria were used to record them:  
a) If the two hyperinflations occurred before 1949, then the most recent one is considered. This is 
the case of Hungary, with one hyperinflation occurring after WWI and another one after WWII. 
b) If one happened before 1949 and another after 1949, then the less recent hyperinflation is the 
one considered. This is the case of Russia, with one in the early 1920s and another one in the 
early 1990s. c) If the two of them occurred after 1949, then the less recent one would be 
considered (no case like this occurs in the sample, though). The above criteria were set with two 
ideas in mind. First, to maximize the number of years spanning the post-hyperinflationary period, 
so as to highlight the role of past hyperinflations on subsequent inflation outcomes, and second to 
minimize the number of missing observations before 1949, the first year with data in the IMF-IFS 
database.  
  II.B.3. Regression results 
A simple univariate regression shows that a dummy variable for the existence of past 
hyperinflation has a strong negative (and statistically significant) correlation with the actual 
cross-country rates of inflation. (Given criticism related to the fact that Taiwan is not universally 
  6accepted as a country, it was excluded from the regressions presented in this paper. Results are 
slightly better if Taiwan is included. The results including Taiwan are available upon request 
from the author and included in Guerrero, 2006b). Countries that experienced hyperinflation tend 
to have, on average, a rate of inflation 5 percentage points lower than the average rate of inflation 
for the countries that lacked the same experience. The result is statistically significant at the 0.1% 
level, with a t-statistic of -3.75 (The t-stat is -3.89 if Taiwan is included). Moreover, this result is 
relatively robust to the exclusion of sample outliers. If Zambia is excluded from the sample, the 
estimated coefficient falls, in an absolute value sense, from -5 to -4.39, the t-statistic falls (also in 
an absolute value sense) from -3.75 to -3.68 (from -3.89 to -3.80 if Taiwan is included), and the 
coefficient remains statistically significant at the 0.1% level. If all the countries displaying annual 
average rates of inflation higher than or equal to 50% (Zambia, Uganda, Indonesia, and Chile) are 
excluded from the sample, the estimated coefficient falls again, in absolute value terms, to -3.24 
(-3.35 when Taiwan is included) but remains statistically significant at the 0.2% level, with a t-
statistic of -3.21 (-3.35 if Taiwan is included). If, alternatively, all the countries with annual 
average rates of inflation higher than or equal to 40% (Zambia, Uganda, Indonesia, Chile, 
Uruguay) are excluded from the sample, the estimated coefficient is now -2.95 (-3.06 when 
Taiwan is included) and the statistical significance is still at the 0.3% level with a t statistic of -
3.03 (-3.18 in the case Taiwan is included). Even if 6 more countries are deleted from the sample 
(Guinea Bissau, Turkey, Israel, Ghana, Mozambique and Yemen), so that only countries with 
average annual rates of inflation lower than or equal to 30% remain, the coefficient remains 
marginally statistically significant at the 5% level and reveals that countries that experienced 
hyperinflations display rates of inflation that are on average 1.5 percentage points lower than the 
one in the average country of the cross-section. (Results when Taiwan is included are as follows: 
t-statistic, -2.07; p-value, 0.04; coefficient, -1.66).  
Table 3 presents the multivariate regression results for all but one of the countries in the 
sample: Zambia, a clear outlier among the countries that did not experience hyperinflation, 
  7displaying an average rate of inflation of 82% (the results that include Zambia are marginally 
better and are reported in Guerrero, 2006b). The vector of control variables in Table 3 (and also 
in Table 4 and Table 5) is composed of the following. First, dummy variables for former colonies 
of Spain and France were included. As discussed in Barro [1997, pp. 113-16], former colonies of 
Spain tend to display relatively high cross-sectional rates of inflation whereas the converse is true 
for former colonies of France. Second, following McCandless and Weber [1995] and Lucas 
[1996], two proxies for the average growth of the money supply are alternatively included: the 
rate of growth of M2 and the rate of growth of Base Money. Third, given that initially richer 
countries could have had better institutions across the board, the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita in 1950 is included to try to shut-off that channel of variation in the cross-sectional rate of 
inflation. Similarly, both the existence of armed conflicts and a low degree of prevalence of the 
rule of law can lead to poor inflation outcomes that are themselves independent of the existence 
of hyperinflation in the past. For that reason, proxies for both the degree of prevalence of the rule 
of law and the existence of wars were also included in the vector of control variables. In doing so, 
we follow Barro [1997] and Guerrero [2006a]. Finally, so as to avoid picking up the effect of 
globalization on global disinflation during the 1990s, a point stressed in Rogoff [2003], two 
alternative proxies for disinflation in the world were included as right-hand side regressors: (i) the 
absolute difference in the average rate of inflation between the 1990s and the 1980s for every 
country, and (ii) the relative (%) difference in the average rate of inflation between the 1990s and 
the 1908s for every country. Recalling that regressions are of a purely cross-sectional variety, 
these measures do not introduce a problem with the left hand side variable (the rate of inflation 
over the period 1949-2002 for every country, except for the ones suffering hyperinflation, for 
which the average rate of inflation in the post-hyperinflation period is considered).     
  The results in Table 3 are both economically and statistically important. Countries that 
experienced hyperinflation have subsequent rates of inflation that are 15 percentage points below 
  8the rate of inflation of the average sample country that never experienced hyperinflation.  This 
result is statistically significant at least at the 5% level across different specifications.  
  How sensitive to the elimination of outliers are the results shown in Table 3? In 
particular, what happens if all the countries with rates of inflation higher than or equal than 50% 
(Uganda, Indonesia, and Chile, in addition to Zambia) are removed from the sample? Table 4 
provides the answer. Results stay statistically significant at the 5% level, but now the quantitative 
economic impact of a hyperinflationary experience is cut by a third to roughly 10 percentage 
points.  
More challenging tests can be posed to the results displayed in Table 4. What happens, 
for instance, if all the countries with rates of inflation in excess of 40% (Zambia, Uganda, 
Indonesia, Chile, and Uruguay) are excluded from the sample? Results are displayed in Table 5. 
The quantitative effect of hyperinflation is roughly 8 percentage points, on average. Results for 
the hyperinflation dummy stay statistically significant at the 5% level. This last result is shown to 
survive even if the sample is reduced to countries that are members of the OECD. Unsurprisingly, 
given the loss of degrees of freedom involved in such an exercise, the statistical significance level 
is reduced to the 10% level in some specifications (though it remains at the 5% level for 50% the 
cases).  The interested reader can find this and other robustness results in Guerrero [2006b].  
 
III. A MODEL 
This is an endowment economy where real per capita output, , is given (and constant) 
at every instant:  . Population is constant and its size is normalized to unity for 
convenience. The economy is composed of two groups of individuals. A fraction 
t y
t y yt ∀ > = 0
γ  is composed 
of fully rational individuals endowed with perfect foresight (their behavior is fully described 
below in section 3. 1.). A fraction  ) 1 ( γ −  is boundedly rational. In particular, their rationality is 
limited in regards to their understanding of the full consequences of inflation finance. Their 
  9behavior is summarized in subsection III.B. below and the implications of their limited rationality 
more fully discussed in section IV.  
The remaining part of this section proceeds as follows. A standard representative agent 
model is presented first, in section III.A., to describe the behavior of the γ -agents. Next, the 
assumptions on the  ) 1 ( γ − agents are summarized in sub-section III.B. Subsection III.C. 
aggregates the behavior of the two types of agents and presents the macroeconomic equilibrium. 
Subsection III.D. discusses the government finances and the political constraints to raise tax 
collections. Subsection III.E. presents the main social tradeoff between increasing the collection 
of conventional taxes versus increasing the collection of the inflation tax and subsection III.F. 
models social preferences between conventional taxes and inflation in the aftermath of 
hyperinflation.  
III.A. Microeconomic optimization by the gamma-group representative agent  
The γ -group representative agent is assumed to be infinitely lived, forward looking, and 
endowed with perfect foresight. (S)he supplies labor inelastically, and maximizes: 
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m ≡ ,   represents the nominal stock of money, the only asset the   t M γ -group 
representative agent holds at any instant t,   represents the price level  at any instant t, u (.) and 
v (.) are known as the instantaneous utility functions (assumed to be strictly increasingly 
concave), and the parameter
t P
ρ  is the rate of time preference, or the subjective discount rate, 
which is assumed to be strictly positive and equal to the real rate of interest, for simplicity. The 
index γ  that denotes the agent’s group has been dropped to keep notation as simple as possible, 
and it will also be ignored in what follows, so long as there is no room for confusion.  
  10It is also assumed that the instantaneous utility function v (.) adopts the following 
functional form:  
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The previously assumed functional form has been used before in studies of seigniorage 
during episodes of runaway inflation [i.e., Calvo and Leiderman, 1992] and it is also very 
convenient in the present context, since it will give rise to a generalized form of Cagan’s money 
demand (see below, equation (13), p. 15). 
The maximization is made subject to the following constraints: 
t t t t t x m c y m
dt
dm
τ π − + − − = ≡
•
) 3 (  




t t t e m
ρ λ  
t c m t t ∀ > 0 , ) 5 (     and   is given.  0 m
Equation (3) is usually called the evolution equation and acts as an intra-period budget constraint. 
In equation (2),  π  is the rate of inflation (so that the term  t tm π  represents the inflation tax on 
real cash balances), x denotes lump-sum government transfers per capita, and τ  denotes lump-
sum taxes per capita (the last two are assumed to be taken as given by the γ -group representative 
agent when solving the maximization problem).  
Equation (4) is the so-called transversality condition, a condition that guarantees the 
fulfillment of the lifetime budget constraint of the γ -group representative agent. Equation (4), 
sometimes also called no-Ponzi game or no-bubbles condition, guarantees that the real value of 
the individual’s assets does not explode as time passes by (recall that π  was not formally 
restricted to be positive), thus acting as an intertemporal budget constraint in the optimization 
program. In equation (4), λ  represents the shadow value of theγ -group representative agent’s 
lifetime wealth.  
  11Last but not least, (5) describes the initial condition for the stock of money per capita, and 
the relevant non-negativity constraints.  
Making use of Fisher’s parity condition, a condition that holds true in the present context 
of perfect foresight, the nominal interest rate can be linked to the real interest rate, ρ , and the 
inflation rate,  t π , as follows: 
t t i π ρ + = ) 6 (  
The solution to the maximization problem is obtained by means of Pontryagin’s maximum 
principle. Setting up the current value Hamiltonian:  
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Treating c as the control variable and m as the state variable (with λ  being the associated costate 
variable), gives the following first order conditions: 
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Taking antilogs to (10) yields: 
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In other words, a generalized form of Cagan’s money demand (Cagan, 1956) is obtained 
for group γ -consumers. 
III.B. Behavioral assumptions for the boundedly rational consumers 
  12  These agents also hold only one asset, money. How do they arrive to a well-defined 
demand for money? The answer has two parts. 
(i) These agents understand the working of intra-period budget constraints like the one given by 
equation (3). However, they are not intertemporal maximizers. Instead, 
(ii) They arrive to a heuristic version of the money demand equation given by (11). They do not 
obtain it through optimization, though, but rather through a mix of heuristics, empirical 
investigation (following in the footsteps of Cagan, 1956), and imitation of the behavior of the 
gamma consumers.  Accordingly, their demand for money schedule involves a constant semi-
elasticity of real money demand with respect to the rate of inflation, exactly as in Cagan [1956].
2 
Formally: 
0 , ; ) 12 ( > =
− α
απ F e F m a t  
Finally, and with the purpose of facilitating aggregation (see section 3.3. below), it is also 
assumed that: 
(iii) They consume all of their disposable income every period (their saving rate equals zero). 
III.C. Macroeconomic equilibrium 
A necessary step in transforming this setup into a macroeconomic model is to impose the 
relevant market clearing condition for a closed economy with no government spending: 
. Conceptually, macroeconomic equilibrium can only be achieved if aggregate 
spending equals aggregate supply at every instant.  
t y y c t t ∀ = =
Given both the aggregate market clearing condition just discussed and the fact that 
) 1 ( γ − -consumers do not save, in equilibrium γ -consumers do not save either. Hence, we plug 
the condition   back into equation (11) to see what it implies for the demand for 
money schedule of 
t y y c t t ∀ = =
γ -consumers. After redefining the constant term A in such a way that the 
term involving the discount rate ρ  is now a part of a new constant term, F, gives the following 
closed-form solution for money demand for group γ -consumers: 
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 Because  α , the semielasticity of money demand with respect to the rate of inflation, is 
now constant for the γ -consumers as well, from a macroeconomic perspective there is no 
difference between the money demand schedules characterizing both groups of agents. Hence, 
normalizing F to unity, taking natural logs to (12) --either (12a) or (12b), since they are the same-
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Where a hat sign over a variable denotes the natural log of that variable.  
Equation (13) is linear in the logs and can be solved using the integrating factor method. 
Rewriting (13) to express it in terms of the integrating factor and taking the integral yields: 
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Where K is an arbitrary constant of integration, still to be determined.  
At this point, modern day macroeconomists’ standard method of solution to the 
differential equation given by (14) follows a suggestion by Sargent and Wallace [1973], and 
proceeds by imposing a transversality condition that calls for the limit of the first term in the left 
hand side of equation (14) to vanish as t approaches infinity. After that, equation (14) is evaluated 
for t = 0, and the constant of integration is thus endogenously obtained. The solution so obtained 
is indeed very appealing in contexts where the variable to be determined (typically the price of an 
asset) can be reasonably assumed to remain bounded from above. 
3 This is not the case in the 
present context of hyperinflation. There is no reason to believe that during hyperinflations the 
price level remains bounded from above. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that this is not the 
case (see Cagan [1956, p. 26], Table 1, and Figures 1 through 7, pp. 28-40). Therefore, a terminal 
  14condition as a way to determine the value of K will not be imposed here. Instead, equation (14) is 
directly evaluated for t = 0, which gives:  . Furthermore, it is also assumed that   
is exogenously given as of time zero. 
) 0 ( ˆ P K − = ) 0 ( ˆ P
4 The price level at time zero is thus determined outside the 
model. This is not a problem in the present context. First, as is shown below, this method of 
solution highlights the role that different monetary histories play in determining the current price 
level, the main issue this paper investigates.  Second, this method is clearly better than the 
standard alternative in the present context, since the latter involves the assumption of an upper 
bound for the price level during hyperinflations that is easily falsified by all existing empirical 
evidence, as previously discussed.   
Evaluating (14) for t = 0 and solving for the (log of) the price level as of time t yields: 
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The first interesting feature worth mentioning about equation (15) is that the second term 
of the right hand side represents the monetary history of the economy. Given an initial condition 
for the price level and a value for α , the semielasticity of real money demand with respect to the 
rate of inflation, the first right-hand side addend implies an exponential trajectory for the price 
level. Similarly, for given values of the money supply, α , and the time periods s and t, the 
second right-hand side addend substracts a constant value from the first addend, and so the 
‘wilder’ the monetary history of the economy (i.e., the more the money supply has been expanded 
in the past), the higher the value that is substracted from the first addend. Note in passing that 




, the whole second term of the right hand side tends to vanish. Intuitively, the second 
term of the right hand side is not relevant for countries with monetary histories involving “mild 
enough” inflationary outcomes.  
III.D. Government finances and the political constraints to raise taxes 
  15  Government transfers are assumed to be subjected to random shocks, some of which, 
occurring with non-negligible positive probability, imply very high realizations for the value of 
government transfers (a relevant historic example is given by the need to pay war reparations). 
Formally, 
t t x x ε + =
−
) 16 (  
Where   stands for the “historic” or “normal” level of government transfers, and
−
x ε  denotes the 
random shocks affecting government transfers. 
   It is assumed that tax collections are exactly enough to cover “historic” or “normal” 
levels of government transfers, whatever the value of those maybe. That is, 
0 ) 17 ( ≡ −
−
x t τ  
Hence, if there is a positive shock to government transfers (say, because of the sudden 
need to pay war reparations), then the government has to run a budget deficit. Following the 
literature on hyperinflations that Cagan [1956] pioneered, it is also assumed that the government 
has exhausted its borrowing capacity and so it cannot issue new debt. Therefore, budget deficits 
have to be monetized, if more taxes cannot be collected.  Almost every study about hyperinflation 
emphasizes the crucial role of seigniorage. What is less often emphasized in analytical studies of 
hyperinflation is that sudden increases in tax collections are not easy to achieve when a modern 
tax system is a missing institution, as was the case in the economies that lived through 
hyperinflation. Some brief examples can be drawn from history (See Bresciani Turroni, [1937, 
pp. 48-49] for the case of Germany, Makinen [1986, p. 796] for the case of Greece, and Heymann 
[1991, p. 115] for the case of Argentina). A representative quotation follows:  
“The difficulty of increasing the income of the Reich was due…to the particular structure 
of the German financial system, which was founded on a tripartition of the income between the 
Reich, the State, and the Municipalities, which did not provide the Reich with an income capable 
of being expanded and easily adapted to increasing needs” (Italics added). Bresciani Turroni 
[1937. pp. 48-49] 
  
  16This paper assumes that at any given time there is a maximum increase in tax collections 
that is socially tolerable and politically feasible. A large enough shock to government transfers ---
requiring an increase in tax collections that hits the maximum socially tolerable level-- implies 
that the required increase in the tax rates will not be legislated, and so the resulting budget deficit 
will have to be financed through the inflation tax. To circumvent issues connected with the 
political game, a random draw from the toss of a coin is assumed to determine that the  ) 1 ( γ −  
agents, those with a limited understanding of the full scale effects of inflation finance, constitute a 
majority in the economy, which is sufficient to deliver the result previously described. 
5
Formally,    




0 τ , there exists a finite achievable increase in tax collections:  
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(ii)  The required increase in tax collections needed to finance a random increase in government 
transfers is given by:  
t t
needed x τ ε τ − + ≡ Δ
−
) (   when  0 > t ε  
 
Hence, if the required increase in tax collections exceeds the increase that is socially tolerable, the 
resulting budget deficit is financed through the inflation tax. Formally: 
If    t t t t
tolerable needed m x π τ τ τ = − ⇒ Δ ≥ Δ ) (
Establishing a well-functioning, modern tax system is socially costly, as shown by the 
evidence reported in Cukierman et al. [1992], and especially so for countries that live through a 
hyperinflation, since tax collections cannot increase in any easy way to cover a sudden increase in 
government transfers. For instance, Bomberger and Makinen [1983, pp. 804-806] show that for 
  17all but 3 months during the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-46, less than 10% of expenditures 
were covered by legislated tax revenues and that figure fell to 5% for the final 2 months of the 
hyperinflation.  
III.E. The social trade-off 
The main public policy trade-off is between the costs of increasing conventional tax 
collections and the costs associated with seigniorage.  
  One way to formalize that trade-off in a very simple way is to assume that in order to 
overcome the costs of information gathering and processing associated with the direct tracking of 
the political processes that lead to decisions on the financing of the government’s budget, all 
agents take a short-cut and infer the social costs of increasing tax collections from the information 
embedded in the price level. In other words, it is assumed that the public observes a reduced-form 
of the political processes related to the financing of the government’s budget at zero cost: the 
price level; the higher it turns out to be, the higher the implied costs for the government of 
increasing tax collections, from the perspective of the agents.   
Thus, the (log of) the cost of increasing tax collections is assumed to be proportional to 
the (log of) the price level. Formally: 
0 ; ˆ ˆ ) 18 ( > = β β t t P C   
Therefore, plugging (18) back into (15), we get the following expression for the cost of 
increasing tax collections: 




− − − =
0





Notice that according to (19), if the money supply has grown at a rate higher than the rate 
implied by the exponential factor 
α
1
, then, given the negative sign preceding the second term on 
the right hand side of (19), the cost of increasing tax collections falls with the intensity at which 
the money supply has expanded in the past, a crucial insight when trying to rationalize why 
  18countries that experienced hyperinflations display substantially lower rates of inflation than 
similar countries lacking the same experience: hyperinflations act by reducing the social costs of 
collecting more (conventional) taxes.     
III.F. Social preferences in the aftermath of hyperinflation  
An equivalent way to formalize the social trade-off is to assume that social preferences 
between conventional distorsionary taxes and the inflation tax can be represented by a standard 
quadratic loss function that a benevolent government tries to minimize. The loss function takes 
the following form: 
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Where  , is, as argued when discussing equations (15) and (19), 
the monetary history of the economy, 
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δ  is the parameter that reflects aversion to taxation, and θ  
is the parameter denoting inflation aversion. It is also assumed, following the discussion in the 
previous subsection, that δ  decreases with the intensity of the inflationary history of the 
economy and the opposite is true of θ . Finally, following equations (16) and (17), it is assumed 
that the period budget constraint of this benevolent government implies that transfers are financed 
by both distorsionary taxes and the inflation tax. Formally: 
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  Solving for taxes in (21), plugging the resulting equation back into (20), differentiating 
with respect to  t π  (taking inflationary expectations as given), setting the first order condition 
equal to zero and solving for the rate of inflation gives the following government’s best response 
when acting in a discretionary fashion:  
) ( ) (
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  19  Note that both when  +∞ → δ  and  0 → θ ,  +∞ → π .  
Partial differentiation of (22) with respect to H yields:  
0
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  Hence, the long-term effects of hyperinflations on long-term inflation outcomes are 
present even for central banks acting under discretion (no commitment).  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The previous result is interesting because it shows that hyperinflations do not need to lead 
to radical institutional reforms (such as the adoption of a currency board in Argentina as of April 
1
st, 1991, for instance) in order to have an effect on long-term inflation outcomes. Guerrero and 
Heymann [2006] provide further discussion on this issue. 
Three topics deserve further discussion. First, where are the political constraints to raise 
income or consumption taxes coming from? Why could the  ) 1 ( γ − agents prefer the inflation tax 
vis-à-vis either an income or a consumption tax? Second, what is the role played by the 
assumption that the  ) 1 ( γ −  agents have a limited understanding of the full effects of inflation 
finance in achieving the result contained in equation (19)? Finally, the third issue is related to the 
practical relevance of the assumed trade-off between conventional tax collections and the 
inflation tax during hyperinflation episodes and the consequent need to raise tax collections to 
stabilize the price level.  
  Turning to the first issue, the  ) 1 ( γ − agents’ opposition to the enactment of either income 
or consumption taxes stem (partly, at least) from the straightforward nature of these taxes. In both 
cases, it can easily be inferred what those taxes mean for welfare. Consider an income tax first. 
The intra-period budget constraint in this case becomes: 
m c x y y π τ + = + − ) 1 ( ) 24 (  
  20Opposition to the income tax only requires a rudimentary understanding of the intra-period 
budget constraint. By assumption, both groups of consumers fully understand this. 
  Turning to the consumption tax, a similar case arises. The intra-period budget constraint 
in this case becomes: 
m c t x y c π + + = + ) 1 ( ) 25 (  
  The tax on consumption simply raises the effective price of consumption. Again, 
) 1 ( γ − agents fully understand it, since it is a simple implication of the working of the intra-
period budget constraint.  
  Unfortunately, the costs of the inflation tax are not so easy to grasp, and so inflation 
finance may be more appealing than conventional taxation for the  ) 1 ( γ − group, at least before 
hyperinflation has occurred. Even when the inflation tax is clearly present in the period-budget 
constraint of  ) 1 ( γ −  agents, the logic of the costs of inflation finance are far more subtle to grasp 
than the costs of either income or consumption taxes. First, agents in the  ) 1 ( γ − group should 
have to understand the relation between the use of the printing press and the associated increase 
in inflation. Unfortunately, there is a disconnection between the additional printing of money to 
cover government transfers and the increase in prices that reduce the purchasing power of money, 
the only part that the  ) 1 ( γ − -agents are able to perceive through the inflation tax term in their 
intra-period budget constraints. Second, and even more subtle, is the idea that inflation tax 
avoidance requires economizing on the use of real money balances (and hence a decrease in 
welfare through increased transaction costs) on the part of all agents. This step involves not just 
an understanding of the instantaneous utility function v(m), which is not an explicit part of 
) 1 ( γ − -agents’ decision-making processes, but also a conceptual comprehension of the meaning 
of equation (12) --the equation that describes the behavior of money demand, something 
fundamentally more difficult, and something that agents in the  ) 1 ( γ − group derived by purely 
  21heuristic methods. Agents in the γ − 1 ( ) group are quite sophisticated economic agents (they 
managed to arrive to a very similar money demand schedule as the one derived by agents in the 
γ -group, after all), but their failure to fully understand the consequences of inflation finance may 
force the economy through a hyperinflation, if they constitute a majority (or if they are in control 
of monetary policy). A historically relevant example of a typical  ) 1 ( γ −  agent is provided by 
Helfferich, the representative of the Chancellor of the Republic of Weimar in the Reichsbank in 
post World War I Germany (quoted by Bresciani Turroni [1937, p. 34]):  
“The increase of the circulation has not preceded the rise of prices and the depreciation of the 
exchange, but it followed slowly and at great distance. The circulation increased from May 1921 
to the end of January 1923 by 23 times; it is not possible that this increase had caused the rise in 
prices, which in that period increased by 344 times”.  
 
An understanding of the sharp increase in the velocity of money (i.e. of the type of “flight 
from currency” embedded in equation (12)), and of the implied loss of welfare involved in that 
process is clearly absent in Helfferich’s thinking. Furthermore, Helfferich, a quite sophisticated 
individual who was not only a prominent monetary pundit but also the leader of the right-wing 
political parties in parliament, was not alone. His limited understanding of the effects of inflation 
finance was shared by Havenstein, the president of the Reichsbank, and a good part of the 
German press (see Bresciani Turroni, [1937, p. 50 and 45] respectively).  
          At this point, the reader should note that the assumption about a group of agents 
displaying a limited understanding of the full effects of inflation finance was added to motivate 
the previous discussion on what factors are behind the political constraints on raising 
conventional taxes. But the theoretical result contained in equation (19) is independent of the 
assumption of bounded rationality on the part of the  ) 1 ( γ −  agents. If the assumption of limited 
rationality by the  ) 1 ( γ −  agents is dropped, then (12b) becomes the relevant economy-wide 
money demand schedule. Equation (12b) is then integrated to get equation (15), and so long as 
the assumption embedded in equation (18) still holds true, the result in equation (19) follows.       
  22Turning to the third issue raised at the beginning of this section, the need to raise 
conventional tax collections to stabilize the price level is well- documented, if not always stressed 
in analytical studies. A few illustrative examples follow.  
Referring to the Greek stabilization plan of 1946, Makinen [1986, p. 802] says: 
“Concluded on January 24, 1946, it gave top priority to arresting inflation through budget reforms 
that adjusted the specific tax rates, improved tax collection methods, and increased revenue from 
the sale of aid goods” 
 
With regard to the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-46, Bomberger and Makinen [1983, 
p. 817] show in their Table 5 how tax receipts were more than doubled between the fiscal years 
1946-47 and 1947-48, and referring to the fiscal reforms on the revenue side they add 
(Bomberger and Makinen, [1983, p. 816]): 
“A comprehensive reform of the tax system was undertaken. Rates of taxation were 
raised considerably over those in force prior to the war. Income taxes were imposed at the rate of 
2% on incomes exceeding F1,200 (about $100), rising to a maximum of 60% on income from 
work and 80% on income from property. The maximum rates applied to incomes exceeding 
F84,000. The gross rent on houses was subject to a tax ranging from 60 to 80 percent. The 
purchase tax was raised from the pre-war rate of 2-5 percent to 3-10 percent. The company tax 
had to be paid according to turnover, irrespective of profit. All taxes in arrears were subject to a 
monthly penalty of 10%”   
 
Sargent [1982] shows a similar pattern for the cases of Austria, Poland, and Germany 
(See Sargent, [1982], Table 3.5., p. 83 for the case of Austria, Table 3.13, p. 93 for the case of 
Poland, and Table 3.22., p. 111, for the case of Germany).  
For a more recent episode of hyperinflation, Bolivia 1984-85, Morales [1988, p. 326], 
Table 7. 5.) shows that total tax revenues increased from 1.6% of GDP during the third quarter of 
1895, when hyperinflation reached its peak, to 11.3% of GDP during the fourth quarter of 1985, 
when inflation was stabilized. Morales [1988, p. 318] also describes the reforms on the revenue 
side of the fiscal package introduced by the government to stabilize inflation. In a similar vein, 
Artana [2001, p. 21], Table 7, shows that in the case of Argentina, legislated revenues at the 
national level increased by 25% in real terms between the years 1991, when the currency board 
  23was introduced, and 1992 (the first year inflation fell to low levels). At the provincial level, the 
increase was even more important: 33% in real terms during the same period. Commenting on 
these developments, Artana [2001, p. 19] adds:  
“the inflation tax was replaced by consumption taxes and legislated revenues increased 
by 77% --in constant pesos of the year 2000—between the year 2000 (the year before the collapse 
of the currency board) and the average for the period 1985-90 (the years of the runaway 
inflation).”     
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown evidence indicating that hyperinflationary experience is followed 
by long-term rates of inflation substantially lower than the ones prevalent in countries that lack 
the same experience. The quantitative effect depends on the composition of the control group of 
countries and the vector of control variables used, but it generally is economically and 
statistically significant.      
  There is more than one mechanism through which the long-term effects of hyperinflation 
may have an impact on long-term inflation outcomes. First, there are the psychological effects, 
through the long-lasting memories of the hardships introduced by hyperinflation. Second, there is 
the role of financial adaptation through “hysteresis” in the demand for money: since during 
hyperinflation agents learn to live with less real cash balances, the scope for financing subsequent 
budget deficits through the inflation tax in the aftermath of hyperinflation may be permanently 
reduced.  This paper advanced yet a third, complementary channel: hyperinflations lead to low 
long-term rates of inflation because they change the “marginal rate of technical substitution” 
between conventional taxes, and the inflation tax.    
 
(*)  The author would like to thank Francisco Rodriguez for all the useful discussions held on this 
issue. Detailed comments by Alfredo Canavese and Daniel Heymann, my discussants during the 
2005 Annual Meeting of the Asociación Argentina de Economía Política held at Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata, greatly helped me to improve the quality of the paper. Helpful comments 
were also received from Marco Bonomo, Romulo Chumacero, Luis Jacome, Peter Murrell, John 
Shea, and seminar participants at the University of Maryland at College Park, the American 
University of Paris (during the 2005 Annual Meetings of the Latin American Economic 
  24Association), Universidad Nacional de La Plata, and Concordia University (during the 2006 
Annual Meetings of the Canadian Economic Association). All errors and omissions are my own. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Inflation 
  Variable  Observations    Mean  Std.      Min    Max 
  27Dev. 
Countries After Hyper  21 7.07% 2.68 2.43%  11.88%
-B/w 11.9% and 7.1%  11 9.10% 1.5 7.40%  11.90%
-B/w 7% and 6%  4 6.40% 0.2 6.10%  6.50%
-Under 6%  6 3.80% 1.3 2.40%  5.60%
All No Hyper Countries  117 12.19% 12.93 0.22%  82.79%
-Over 29%  11 44.10% 15.7 28.70%  82.80%
-B/w 12.1% and 29%  17 19.00% 5.3 12.40%  28.20%
-B/w 12% and 7.1%  35 8.70% 1.3 7.10%  11.70%
-Under 7%  53 5.10% 1.4 0.20%  7.00%
OECD countries, no Hyper  23 8.19% 7.69 2.86%  36.93%
-Over 29%  1 36.93%         -          -          - 
-B/w 12.1% and 29%  2 19.83% 3.08 17.65%  22.01
-B/w 12% and 7.1%  3 8.85% 0.99 7.90%  9.88%



























Hyperinflation experiences and subsequent inflation 
Country  AVG Inflation  Period of  
  28  29
Post-Hyper Hyperinflation 
Nicaragua 11.88 1988-89 
Ukraine 10.87 1993 
Kazakhstan 10.02 1994 
Greece 9.88 1943-44 
Bolivia 9.82 1984-85 
Bulgaria 8.89 1997 
China 8.16 1948-49 
Peru 7.96 1988-89 
Georgia 7.71 1993 
Brazil 7.58 1993-94 
Armenia 7.38 1994 
Hungary 6.53 1945-46 
Russia 6.49 1921-24 
Poland 6.45 1923-24 
Argentina 6.12 1989-90 
Croatia 4.62 1993 
Austria 4.37 1921-22 
Azerbaijan 2.90 1993-94 
Germany 2.68 1923 
Macedonia 2.43 1992 











 Table 3: Multivariate OLS Regressions-Whole Sample w/o Zambia 
Dependent Variable is Inflation 
Explanatory Variables         (1)       (2)       (3)         (4)       (5)         (6)       (7) 
Constant    9.1 ( 6.24***)  27.8 ( 3.21***)   27.6 (2.93***)   20.80 (2.28**)   28.3 (3.14***)  27.7 (2.82***)   21.9 (2.35**) 
Dummy Past hyperinflation  -15.1(-3.52***)  -17.1(-2.49**)  -17.6(-2.49**)  -17.4(-2.42**)  -15.7(-2.53**)  -15.2(-2.46**)  -15.17 (-2.42**) 
French  -4.5  (-3.62***)   -7.5 (-3.38***)  -7.5 (-3.25***)   - 8.1 (-3.35***)  -7.8 (-3.36***)  -7.6 (-3.13***)   -8.1 (-3.09***) 
Spain     2.53  ( 0.77)      1.84 ( 0.48)  1.99 (0.49)   2.02 (0.46)  3.00 (0.71)   3.55 (0.84)  2.66 (0.60) 
% Growth of M2  0.25  (2.37**)   0.24 ( 2.15**)     0.23 (2.12**)   0.21 (1.95*)       
log initial (GDP/L)       -1.74 (-1.52)   -1.75 (-1.55*)   -0.65 (-0.57)   -1.59 (-1.33)   -1.65 (-1.46)   -0.63 (-0.56) 
Rule of Law       -1.42 (-1.44)  -1.37 (-1.36)  -1.83 (-1.65)   -1.62 (-1.59)   -1.47 (-1.39)   -1.97 (-1.64) 
Dummy for Wars       -0.49 (-0.17)  -0.46 (-0.16)  -0.70 (-0.23)   0.21 (0.07)   -0.03 (-0.01)   -0.13 (-0.04) 
Budget Deficits      -0.04 (-0.15)  -0.31 (-1.10)       
1990s Disinfl.; Proxy 1         0.002 (0.38)       
Alternative proxies               
% Growth of Base Money           0.15 (1.89*)   0.14 (1.76*)  0.13 (1.69*) 
Public Debt            0.01 (0.33)  0.02 (0.65) 
1990s Disinfl.; Proxy 2              0.003 (0.03) 
Observations  119  97 97 93 99  98 94 
R-Squared  0.21 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.27  0.26 0.28 
F-Stat 6.66  4.69  4.2  4.58  4.61  4.06  3.75 
Prob > F  0.0001  0.0002  0.0003  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0005 












  30Table 4: Multivariate OLS Regressions-Countries with less than 50% inflation 
Dependent Variable is Inflation 
Explanatory Variables         (1)       (2)       (3)         (4)       (5)         (6)       (7) 
Constant  8.7 ( 8.20***)  25.3 ( 3.40***)  23.5 (3.12***)   15.5 (2.19**)   25.2 (3.37***)   23.1 (2.98***)   17.3 (2.39**) 
Dummy Past hyperinflation  -11.2(-3.39***)  -12.00(-2.28**)  -12.3(-2.37**)  -11.5(-2.39**)  -11.5(-2.36**)  -10.6(-2.27**)  -10.4(-2.24**) 
French   -3.5  (-3.33***)     -6.9 (-3.75***)  -6.7 (-3.64***)  -7.55 (-4.09***)  -7.2 (-3.84***)  -6.7 (-3.49***)  -7.2 (-3.78***) 
Spain      2.55  ( 0.93)        1.12 (0.37)  2.02 (0.70)   2.34 (0.80)  10.62 (0.50)   2.58 (0.84)  1.67 (0.54) 
% Growth of M2  0.18  (2.28**)     0.16 ( 2.06**)     0.15 (1.96*)    0.12 (1.76)       
log initial (GDP/L)       -1.00 (-0.92)   -1.04 (-1.02)   0.29 (0.28)   -0.86 (-0.78)   -0.94 (-0.95)   0.05 (0.05) 
Rule of Law       -2.0 (-2.52**)  -1.7 (-2.30**)  -2.36 (-3.11***)  -2.1 (-2.62***)  -1.80 (-2.22**)  -2.3 (-2.66***) 
Dummy for Wars       -3.79 (-1.64)  -3.66 (-1.57)  -4.52 (-2.08**)   -3.12 (-1.32)   -3.35 (-1.39)   -3.76 (-1.67*) 
Budget Deficits      -0.24 (-0.90)  -0.64 (-3.11***)       
1990s Disinfl.; Proxy 1         0.005 (1.34)       
Alternative proxies             
% Growth of Base Money           0.11 (1.77*)   0.09 (1.59)  0.07 (1.48) 
Public Debt          0.03 (0.89)  0.05 (1.57) 
1990s Disinfl.; Proxy 2              0.03 (0.38) 
Observations  116  94 94 90 96 95 91 
R-Squared 0.19  0.32  0.33  0.4  0.31  0.32  0.37 
F-Stat 5.48  4.97  4.37  5.16  5.21  4.3  4.24 
Prob > F  0.0005  0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002 













Table 5: Multivariate OLS Regressions-Countries with less than 40% inflation 
Dependent Variable is Inflation 
Explanatory Variables         (1)       (2)       (3)         (4)       (5)         (6)       (7) 
Constant    8.72  
( 9.02***) 
  27.13  
( 3.75***) 
      25.22  
    (3.44***) 
 17.35  
(2.56**) 
 27.08  
(3.71***) 
      24.56  
     (3.26***) 
 18.93 
(2.75***) 




      -10.20  





      -8.42  
    (-2.38**) 
-8.11  
(-2.36**) 
French   -3.40   
(-3.27***) 
       -6.97  











Spain      0.63  ( 0.29)       -0.86 (-0.34)  0.07 (0.03)   0.31 (0.13)  -0.49 (-0.19)   0.49 (0.20)  -0.36 (-0.14) 
% Growth of M2  0.17  (2.32**)     0.14 ( 2.08**)      0.13 (1.98*)    0.10 (1.76)       
log initial (GDP/L)     -1.28 (-1.23)   -1.32 (-1.36)   -0.02 (-0.02)   -1.84 (-1.41)   -1.25 (-1.39)   -0.32 (-0.36) 
Rule of Law       -1.97 (-2.48**)  -1.67 (-2.24**)  -2.26 (-3.04***)   -2.26 (-1.87*)   -1.66 (-2.09**)   -2.11 (-
2.58**) 
Dummy for Wars       -3.19 (-1.41)  -3.04 (-1.34)  -3.81 (-1.82*)   -2.05 (-0.57)   -2.67 (-1.14)   -3.05 (-1.42) 
Budget Deficits      -0.25 (-0.97)  -0.64 (-3.05***)       
1990s Disinflation; Proxy 1         0.004 (1.22)       
Alternative proxies        
% Growth of Base Money           0.10 (1.69*)   0.07 (1.50)  0.05 (1.37) 
Public Debt      0.04 (1.14)  0.06 (1.98*) 
1990s  Disinflation;  Proxy  2         0.05  (0.58) 
Observations  115 93 93 89 95 94  90 
R-Squared  0.16 0.31 0.33 0.41  0.3  0.33  0.39 
F-Stat  5.95 5.04 4.43 5.16 5.45 4.44  4.32 
Prob  >  F  0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002  0.0001 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%     
 Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This led to the elimination of other well-known episodes of runaway inflation, like Diocletian’s 
inflation, the inflation during the French Revolution of the early 1790s, and the inflation in the US 
Confederacy in the early 1860s. See some evidence on the quantitative magnitude of those historic episodes 
left out here in Tayer Watkins’ homepage: http://www2.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/hyper.htm.  
 
2 At this point, this is all that we need to know about this group of agents. More details about their 
limited understanding of the effects of inflation finance are provided in section four. 
 
3 Sargent and Wallace proposed this solution in the specific context of models of money and 
capital (or money and growth models), not in the context of hyperinflationary paths for the price level, 
despite the fact that they used Cagan’s money demand to motivate their paper. Their use of Cagan’s money 
demand was a purely pragmatic choice to assure analytical tractability and simplicity, but it is worth 
recalling that Sargent and Wallace [1973] were not studying hyperinflationary paths.    
 
4 Given the present continuous time setup, the price level is thus a predetermined variable. Further 
implications from this assumption are discussed in page 21.  
 
5 The assumption that the gamma group is a majority is convenient, but not strictly needed. All 
that is needed is that individuals from that group are in control of inflation finance decisions, as, for 
example, was the case in post World War I Germany with Helfferich and Havenstein (see Bresciani 
Turroni, [1937, pp. 42-57]).    
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